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A central question in brain evolution is how species-typical behaviors, and the
neural function-structure mappings supporting them, can be acquired and inherited.
Advocates of brain modularity, in its different incarnations across scientific subfields,
argue that natural selection must target domain-dedicated, separately modifiable neural
subsystems, resulting in genetically-specified functional modules. In such modular
systems, specification of neuron number and functional connectivity are necessarily
linked. Mounting evidence, however, from allometric, developmental, comparative,
systems-physiological, neuroimaging and neurological studies suggests that brain
elements are used and reused in multiple functional systems. This variable allocation
can be seen in short-term neuromodulation, in neuroplasticity over the lifespan and in
response to damage. We argue that the same processes are evident in brain evolution.
Natural selection must preserve behavioral functions that may co-locate in variable
amounts with other functions. In genetics, the uses and problems of pleiotropy, the
re-use of genes in multiple networks have been much discussed, but this issue has
been sidestepped in neural systems by the invocation of modules. Here we highlight the
interaction between evolutionary and developmental mechanisms to produce distributed
and overlapping functional architectures in the brain. These adaptive mechanisms must
be robust to perturbations that might disrupt critical information processing and action
selection, but must also recognize useful new sources of information arising from internal
genetic or environmental variability, when those appear. These contrasting properties
of “robustness” and “evolvability” have been discussed for the basic organization of
body plan and fundamental cell physiology. Here we extend them to the evolution and
development, “evo-devo,” of brain structure.
Keywords: cortex, modularity, evo-devo, visual system, neural re-use

Brain evolution is an ultimate expression of neuroplasticity.
Neuroplasticity, in turn, should inform us about what brain
architectures have been selected over evolutionary time. If any
current computer users were informed that their personal computers, which heretofore had been used only for word processing,
could also store and transform images, few would be amazed.
If the same people, however, were informed that their parents’
video cameras, by simply adding new input and output devices,
could function as word processors, they would probably be
incredulous, and undertake a re-analysis of their presumptions
about video camera technology. In the same way, understanding of how brains can change and understanding of neural
architecture should bootstrap each other. The multiple kinds of
brain plasticity—evolutionary, developmental, damage-induced
and normal individuation—should be joined together into a
natural unit for this investigation.
To understand how brains evolve, a central goal must be to
distinguish a brain modification resulting from a direct genetic
change in a single brain location from the spreading, downstream
reorganization produced by adaptive nature of the brain itself

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

responding to that genetic change. For example, a genetic change
might directly cause the enlargement of the precursor pool for
a single brain region and increase its neuron numbers, or, cause
those neurons to express a new neurotransmitter, or, increase
their axonal branching. Following on any one of these changes,
however, the regions to which a genetically-altered region connects might be reconfirmed in any number of ways through
“standing” mechanisms of neural development and plasticity,
about which we now have extensive knowledge. For example, loss
or gain in neuron numbers in connecting structures could result
via changes in trophic support in normal developmental cell
death, or changes in the volume of axonal and dendritic arbors
via new activity levels, or new connectivity at the neuron level
via Hebbian synaptic sorting under changed parameters. These
mechanisms are the environment in which genetic change must
operate. Although neuroplasticity was first understood through
observations of adaptive responses to damage or stress, for example, rerouting of axons to new targets when a target was lost, or
upregulation of excitability in case of denervation, it can now
be understood in a larger context. The developing domain of
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“evo-devo,” the study of the selection of developmental mechanisms in evolution (Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005), is the context
to understand neuroplasticity more broadly as stabilized adaptive responses to genetic as well as environmental variation. A
few uncontroversial examples of how selection might favor some
classes of developmental mechanisms over others will illustrate
this idea. Co-regulation of neurogenesis, gliogenesis and vascularization rather than independent specification of each could make
an entire such assembly more robust to variation in any part. The
existence of basic Hebbian circuity or directed re-use of existing
circuitry could enable either new environmental sources of information, or new information introduced by genetic change (e.g.,
new receptor sensitivities) to be automatically employed without
requiring committed recognition circuitry to be generated by random variation and selected at each processing stage in the brain,
allowing evolvability. No impermissible precognition resides in
such mechanisms, only the fact that the normal opportunities,
variations and disasters of life on earth, small and large, external and external, will progressively filter all organisms for those
containing the suite of mechanisms that allowed their ancestors’
survival.
Before we discuss these aspects of neuroplasticity, we need to
examine assumptions about basic brain architecture that have
proliferated independently in the different groups of scientists
who concern themselves with the brain. Developmental biologists, neuroethologists, geneticists, anthropologists, psychologists, neuroscientists and cognitive and computer scientists each
bring their own explanatory taxonomies to the investigation, each
grappling with the relationship of their taxonomy to the physical
parts of the brain using the analytical tools and measurements
each has at hand. In this review, we will examine the interaction
of particular concepts of brain architecture with mechanisms of
neural development and plasticity. Particularly, we will discuss the
idea of a “module,” a hypothesis about the relationship of speciestypical behaviors (from escape behaviors in molluscs to language
in humans) to single neurons or brain part. This hypothesis
about function-structure relationships has different names and
forms in different disciplines, such as “proper mass” or “mosaic
evolution” in paleontology and comparative neuroanatomy, or
“massive modularity” in psychology and cognitive science. Note
that the sense of the word “module” as it is often used in neurobiology (e.g., Buxhoeveden and Casanova, 2002) to mean simply
a unit or segment that can be iterated, like a cortical column,
is not the sense of the term we are considering here. Our second focus is “evolvability” (Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005). Central
to evo-devo is the resolution of the apparent paradox that existing developmental processes must have been selected both to be
robust to perturbations and accidents, but not so robust as to
not be “evolvable,” and should be able to allow, or even facilitate useful evolutionary variation. The concepts of “module” and
“evolvability” have found extensive empirical intersection in the
general problem of how to allocate neuron number, volume, and
metabolic energy to important brain functions in each species
independently, and across species. Here we will offer some initial
proposals regarding how conserved developmental mechanisms
may channel neural reuse, and begin the process of identifying those neural mechanisms that must eventually resolve the

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

brain’s evo-devo paradox, shedding light on how the allocation
and reallocation of neural resources is made on both individual
and evolutionary scales.
In the immediately following historical overview, we will concentrate on work that has described resource assignment and allocation in the brain. In anthropology, comparative neuroanatomy
and neuroscience, researchers generally address neural number
and brain volume, and integration of information at the level
of single neurons. In current neuroimaging and cognitive neuroscience, volume and amount of activation, as determined in
current neuroimaging methods, are the central measures. These
brief histories are not meant to be comprehensive, but to remind
readers of several intellectual threads we hope to integrate. We
will interleave some empirical work on the developmental specification and control of neuron number, brain volume and brain
activation with discussion of brain architecture and with this history, but will follow with more detailed examples after candidate
brain architectures as they are understood in several disciplines
have been laid out.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MODULARITY DEBATE
NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROETHOLOGY

The reverse-engineering stance of the first electrophysiologists
like Hubel and Wiesel (1962), Mountcastle et al. (1975) and
Schiller et al. (1976), that much could be learned from investigating the responses of single neurons and inferring from their
properties the mechanisms of perception and action, dominated
the early years of central nervous system investigation. For these
explicitly atheoretical, inductive approaches, the fact that single neuron responses in the cortex were reasonably interpretable
by presenting simple stimuli to cats and monkeys produced an
explosion of descriptive and systematic research. In due course
these lines of work became subsumed under more analyticallydriven work, such as the “single neuron doctrine” of Barlow
(1972), and later by the more functionally driven “levels of
analysis” approach of Marr (1982).
The idea of the brain as an evolved organ, however, was singularly absent from the work of all of these researchers. The
idea that the brain is best viewed as a collection of functionallycommitted circuits, each put in place by natural selection, rose in
parallel, in opposition to the initial descriptive approach (Camhi,
1984). Neuroethologists concatenated a number of strategies and
hypotheses together in their evolutionary approach: that the best
kinds of behavior for study were those essential for survival,
under strong, species-typical selection (e.g., mating calls or other
species-typical communication, or prey capture and recognition);
that these were best studied in “simpler” systems than large mammals; and that attention must be paid to the environment of each
species and how every signal should be perceived or produced
in relation to that context. Finally, it was assumed the nervous
system ideally should be specialized for these specific adaptive
ends throughout, from receptor to motor neuron. In essence, each
piece of adaptive behavior was imagined to be supported by a
committed, specialized module.
In the famous case of frog prey capture, the center-surround
receptive fields were characterized as “fly detectors” (Lettvin et al.,
1959); in the toad, “worm” and “anti-worm” signaling at the level
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of the midbrain tectum was said to direct prey-strike or avoidance directly (Ewert, 1984). The frog auditory system bracketed
in its two auditory end-organs the two essential croak frequencies, and the hunt was on to locate the and-gate for those two
frequencies, a single-neuron “croak detector” somewhere in the
frog brain (Frishkopf et al., 1968). For songbirds, the “song system” was designated within the bird brain and each component
given its own song-specific nomenclature (Nottebohm et al.,
1976). (This initial description virtually precluded understanding
song in terms of the non-song circuitry it was embedded in and
presumably derived from, now being redressed—e.g., Goldberg
et al., 2012). In invertebrates, the useful feature of individuallyidentifiable, large neurons raised the prospect of a direct map of
the circuitry of these large neurons to a short list of the behaviors these animals could produce (Camhi, 1984). As with reverse
engineering, the neuroethological approach yielded an explosion
of useful information. In due course, in virtually every case, realization began to arise that not every feature of adaptive behavior
mapped directly to corresponding special adaptations in neurons
and neuronal circuits, and that many features were vertebrate(and invertebrate-) general. Some of these findings will be listed
here, and we’ll return to a more specific discussion of aspects of
neuroplasticity in this domain later.
Across the board, it became apparent that peripheral receptors
(at least in vertebrates) are rarely tuned narrowly to the frequency
of a communication channel, or the color of a preferred food,
but rather tend to be broadly tuned to extract information in
the channel of interest, the entire visible spectrum, for example
(Lythgoe and Partridge, 1989; Kocher, 2004; Spady et al., 2006;
Osorio and Vorobyev, 2008). Often, it appeared that it was the
signal rather than signal decoding that had undergone selection to
be maximally apparent or attention-getting to a generic nervous
system, termed “sensory exploitation.” Systems as diverse as visual
signaling in fish and anoles, mating croaks in frogs, and fruit identification in primates have this characteristic (Ryan, 1998; Persons
et al., 1999). Specializations nested in broad channels, such as
visual and auditory “foveas” are more common adaptations than
commitment of all resources to a specialized bandwidth. In parallel, the computational complexity of the problems common
to all vertebrates (or, in fact, all mobile life-forms) began to
be better appreciated. General functions such as localization of
items of interest in egocentric space, construction of topographic
maps, learning the benefits and consequences of particular cues or
environments, recognizing food or conspecifics as a category (as
distinguished from recognition of one’s own species), and motor
control, all had to co-exist with any specialized circuitry. Generic
“environments” exist as well: across niches, visual and acoustic
environments on earth, “natural scenes,” proved to have a specific,
statistical structure that all nervous systems of any complexity
must exploit (Field, 1994; Lewicki, 2002).
Even for the simplest system, considering cases of invertebrates
with small numbers of neurons, and smaller-still numbers of
discrete behaviors, where selection and adaptation might be presumed to produce the most direct linkage of behaviors to distinct,
or encapsulated neuronal pools, modularity was rarely found. For
example, the same set of neurons, in the presence of particular neuromodulators, could produce various functional rhythmic
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behaviors; in marine molluscs with several motor behaviors,
single neurons might be engaged in multiple behaviors (Katz,
2011).
Detailed work with C. elegans demonstrates that single neurons can participate in generating multiple different behaviors, as
a result of the modulation of the neuron’s sensitivity, physical connections, and functional connectivity by various chemicals and
genes. These findings do not at all discount the existence of functional differentiation between these neurons, but they do suggest
that a more nuanced account of their functional complexity is
called for. For instance, the olfactory neuron AWCON can direct
both attraction and repulsion to the same odor, depending on
the presence of specific neuromodulators (Tsunozaki et al., 2008);
and the nocioceptive ASH neurons can cause both social aggregation and avoidance, depending on whether the gap junction with
RMG neurons and the associated aggregation circuit has been
decoupled by the expression of the npr-1 gene, which encodes a
g-protein coupled receptor (Bargmann, 2012). Bargmann writes:
A profound violation of the one neuron-one behavior rule was
uncovered by characterizing behaviors under different conditions.
For example, avoidance of the repulsive odor octanol at particular
concentrations can be generated by two different sets of sensory
neurons. In well fed-animals, octanol avoidance is almost entirely
mediated by the ASH nocioceptive neurons, but after an hour of
starvation, octanol avoidance is distributed between ASH, AWB,
and ADL nocioceptive neurons, revealing a change in circuit composition... Food changes the composition of a circuit for oxygen
preference behavior (aerotaxis) as well... Aerotaxis is more robust
in starved than in well-fed animals, due to the activity of multiple neuromodulators (Cheung et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2006;
Rogers et al., 2006)... the npr-1 neuropeptide receptor that affects
aerotaxis also regulates a second behavior, the aggregation of animals into feeding groups. Aggregation is triggered by a number
of sensory neurons including the nocioceptive ASH neurons and
oxygen sensing URX neurons (de Bono et al., 2002; Coates and
de Bono, 2002)... integrated by one pair of npr-1 expressing neurons called RMGs (Macosko et al., 2009)... npr-1 action in RMG
uncouples the aggregation circuitry, but leaves the avoidance circuitry intact. This allows ASH to generate different behaviors in
two neuromodulatory states. (Bargmann, 2012; pp. 460–461)

By now, the approaches of the descendants of original descriptive electrophysiologists and the neuroethologists have converged,
each adding aspects of the initially opposing view, though the
intellectual lineages of both can still be traced. Understanding of
the complexity of natural scenes and the functions and motivations of perception and behavior came to be part of descriptive
neurophysiological studies (Vinje and Gallant, 2000; Brady and
Oliva, 2008; Adolphs, 2010). The question of how to embed specific adaptive behaviors in the larger contexts of organization is
now being addressed with increasing specificity (Johnson, 2001,
2011).
PALEONTOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE ANATOMY

The resolution of the tools physical anthropologists and comparative anatomists are able to use to examine fossil brains, or
(historically) could be used to describe primate brains is necessarily crude, but a version of the same local-global, modular-
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vs. general purpose-circuitry has played out in these fields at a
larger scale. The most available measurable entity is whole brain
size, allowing taxon-level analysis of changes in the ratio of brain
size to body size (“grade shifts”), coupled with analysis of behavioral changes associated with such changes, like homeothermy or
carnivory (Jerison, 1973; Northcutt, 1981). Subsequently, primatologists and comparative anatomists attempted to link changes
in particular brain parts (e.g., cerebellum; olfactory bulb, a
particular cortical gyrus) to changes in behavior (e.g., motor
ability, visual vs. olfactory specialists; language), usually after
removing shared allometric variation across species. In general,
this behavior-to-residual-structural-variation mapping is termed
“mosaic” brain evolution. Initially, proponents of mosaic brain
evolution pursued the same ends as neuroethologists, in this case
attempting to equate species-specific adaptions with the relative sizes of particular brain parts. Overall, initial investigation
of mosaic evolution produced rather few interesting generalities,
since most behavioral functions are distributed over a number
of regions, and allometric covariation of brain parts is extremely
high, leaving only a few percentage points of residual anatomical variance to map behavioral variation onto (Stephan et al.,
1986; Finlay and Darlington, 1995; Aboitiz, 1996; Finlay et al.,
2001; Yopak et al., 2010). For example, in confronting this puzzle, Aboitiz conjectured if there were somehow two different kinds
of “size” in the brain, the less-interesting shared variance related
to general organismal processes, the remainder important for
species-specific adaptations. As a definitional aside here, note that
in the case of gross brain morphology, “visual cortex,” for example, will mean anatomically-defined visual cortex to anatomists,
and not “regions of brain activated by visual stimulation” as it
will, on occasion, for neuroimaging researchers.
A second version of mosaic adaptation emerged, the simple
identification of any structural components of variation independent of allometric variation, not necessarily predicted from
behavioral specializations (Iwaniuk et al., 2004; Hager et al.,
2012), to be considered as potential sources of evolutionary variation and change. Cross-brain-part covariation associated with
cognitive and behavioral adaptation of residualized volumes is
another way of attempting to locate species-specific adaptations
in volume and number differences (de Winter and Oxnard, 2001;
Sherwood et al., 2012; Smaers and Soligo, 2013).
For this version of mosaicism or modularity, resolution has
not been rapid. Each element of the argument, the nature of
the proposed adaptation (e.g., “planning” in humans), the brain
part on which the adaptation is to depend (“frontal cortex”), and
the survival or reproductive benefit of the adaptation typically
remain conjectures. For example, the hypothesis that humans
have been specially selected for unusual social competence via
specific cortical enlargement, the “social brain hypothesis,” has
become quite popular (Dunbar, 1998, 2012). Note that it is the
linkage of increased volume of particular regions of brain to
social ability that is under debate, not whether social structure in
humans is unusual. Residual excess cortical size, across all areas
(Dunbar, 1993), or enlargement of a particular region involved in
the processing of social information (Powell et al., 2012), or perhaps, the presence of a distinctive type of large neuron (Allman
et al., 2010) have all been proposed and have not been explicitly
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resolved by the proponents of this approach. A similar enduring
debate is whether the frontal cortex in humans has been the subject of special adaptation in relative size, subregions or neuronal
phenotypes, variously associated with aspects of language, multiple behaviors associated with mirror neurons, cognitive control
or planning capabilities. Analyses of old and new data for and
against this claim have been made over a period of 40 years at
this point (of many: Jerison, 1973; Semendeferi et al., 2002, 2011;
Schoenemann, 2006; Barton and Venditti, 2013).
By contrast, the behavioral benefits associated with a relatively
large brain are of obvious adaptive significance, directly measurable and correlate across taxonomic groups. Simple encephalization across birds, mammals generally, and primates correlates
with field measures of behavioral innovation, the rate of success
in invasion of new niches, laboratory measures of behavioral flexibility, and reduced mortality in the field (Lefebvre, 2013). Still,
a reasonable criticism of the “concerted evolution” interpretation
of brain scaling is that large brain divisions like “cerebellum” or
frontal cortex” must reflect many of animal’s specific behavioral
capacities and would certainly contain multiple modules. Thus
many important specializations carved out within overall ability
might be overlooked. The changes in the neuroethological view of
specialization, and the changing views in cognitive neuroscience
about functional commitments, however, have come to intersect
anthropology and gross comparative anatomy in level of analysis, and they inform each other. That is the reason for considering
them together here.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Modularity (Fodor, 1983) is a venerable hypothesis in the understanding of the architecture of the mind and brain, arguably
dating back to 18th century faculty psychology (Reid, 1785/2002)
and its influence on phrenological accounts of brain organization
(Gall, 1857). In its Fodorian incarnation, the modularity hypothesis was that (some of) the mind was constituted as a collection
of specialized, encapsulated, communicating components—or
modules—each dedicated to handling some well-defined aspect
of the overall information-processing requirements of the organism. Insofar as this was so, Fodor argued, then each module should have some specific design features. For instance, it
should be domain specific, in that it has access to (or at least
responds only to) a narrow class of inputs, and transforms
these according to some consistent and well-defined function
to produce its output; it should be encapsulated, i.e., relatively
isolated from influence by the operations of other modules;
and it should be implemented in dedicated neural structures.
From this perspective, it would also appear that the structures of the brain ought to have some of these same features. Insofar as neural structures are dedicated to particular
modules, they will likewise be domain specific and encapsulated with respect to one another. Moreover, each of these
design characteristics is mutually supporting in various ways.
For instance, a module implemented in neural structures shared
with other modules is less likely to be encapsulated relative to
those modules; and if a neural structure serves the needs of
more than one module, it would appear less likely to be domain
specific.
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A modular brain, then, would be a collection of domain
dedicated, functionally specialized, relatively encapsulated neural
structures that together served the information processing needs
of the mind. Fodor himself argued that the only parts of the brain
likely to be modular “to some interesting extent” (Fodor, 1983; p.
37) were “peripheral” structures dedicated to specialized sensory
and motor processing. The probable non-modularity of “central”
systems is a result of their hypothesized function of deriving true
beliefs, and an argument to the effect that our beliefs are holistically related to one another in various ways—for instance, any
belief, regardless of its ostensible domain (e.g., cell biology) could
inferentially impact our acceptance of or the consequences we
derive from any other belief (e.g., one about summer boat travel
in Madagascar). Thus, such central inferential systems are not
informationally encapsulated.
Whatever the merits of this Cartesian distinction between
peripheral and central systems (cf. Dewey, 1896; pp. 357–358), it
seems fair to characterize the current consensus as a rejection of
Fodorian modularity as a research guiding idealization of brain
architecture. The evidence gathered over the past 30 years overwhelmingly indicates that few parts of the brain or processes of
mind appear to have the design characteristics hypothesized by
this brand of modularity. Evidence (for instance) for top-down
effects on visual processing; for cross-modal integration in perception; for the acute sensitivity of modules to developmental
conditions; for cross-modal neural plasticity of many different
sorts; and for the implementation of ostensibly distinct processes
in overlapping neural structures, including the observation that
even very small lesions of the brain typically induce multiple
behavioral deficits, all point to a brain organized along rather different principles than those outlined by Fodor (see Barrett and
Kurzban, 2006; Prinz, 2006; Anderson, 2010, for reviews).
In response to these critiques, and motivated as well by a desire
to integrate psychology and neuroscience more fully with evolutionary biology, advocates of modularity have shifted the focus
from the sort of structurally defined modularity advocated by
Fodor toward a functionalist modularity positing a collection of
functionally specialized, separately modifiable sub-systems, such
that any specific design features of a given module are determined
by individual functional requirements not necessarily shared by
other modules (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Sperber, 2002, 2005;
Barrett and Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006). On this view,
sometimes called “massive modularity,” there is no distinction
between central and peripheral systems, and the focus is squarely
on the evolution of modules that implement solutions to an
organism’s adaptive problems. This represents a step away from
Fodor’s Cartesian focus on central belief-fixing representational
systems, and toward a more pragmatic, interactive account of the
brain’s central role in an organism’s life. Interestingly, however,
massive modularity retains the Fodorian focus on computation,
and with it a focus on the algorithmic (or heuristic) efficiency of
purported psychological solutions to adaptive problems such as
food choice, mate selection, kin identification, and cheater detection. The claim is two-fold: that evolution will favor efficient
solutions, and that the most efficient solutions will be specialized, domain specific, hence modular components. In many ways
this view converges on the approach of the first neuroethologists,
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though these literatures are virtually independent. Consider the
following from Barrett and Kurzban (2006); we quote at length as
some of the details of the position will later become important:
Our position, then, is that functionally specialized mechanisms
with formally definable informational inputs are characteristic
of human (and non-human) cognition and that these features
should be identified as the signal properties of “modularity.” By
this we intend an explicitly evolutionary reading of the concepts
of function and specialization: modules evolved through a process of descent with modification, due to the effects they had
on organisms’ fitness. . . . As a direct and inseparable result of
this evolutionary process of specialization, modules will become
domain specific: Because they handle information in specialized
ways, they will have specific input criteria. . . . For example, systems specialized for assessing the numerosity of objects accept
only representations previously parsed into distinct objects; systems specialized for speech perception process only transduced
representations of sound waves; and systems specialized for making good food choices process only representations relevant to the
nutritional value of different potential food items. (Barrett and
Kurzban, 2006; p. 630)

As should be clear from the quote, it is a central part of massive
modularity that each module should be separately modifiable,
both in theory, and in the course of evolutionary development
[see extensive discussion of this point in Carruthers (2006)].
Indeed, here functional specialization and domain specificity is
a result of the fact that the modules are separately targeted by
evolutionary pressures. Insofar as the focus is on the efficiency
of individual computational solutions, as well as the collective
efficiency of the system as a whole, a collection of separately
modifiable modules that can operate largely in parallel, free of
pleiotropy, can easily seem like an elegant design solution, and
one to which the various demands of evolution might naturally
converge.
And yet, as we have been seeing, the architectures of evolved
nervous systems do not seem to reflect this particular solution.
So, how should we reconceive the principles governing nervous
system evolution? We begin to address this question in the next
section.

FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX, SENSORIMOTOR TO
INTEGRATIVE: MECHANISMS THAT CONTROL BRAIN SIZE
NEURAL PLASTICITY AND NEURAL RE-USE
The large majority of the variation in evolution of vertebrate and
mammalian central nervous system numbers can be described as
concerted, and allometrically predictable (Stephan et al., 1986;
Yopak et al., 2010). Important “grade shifts” in volume allocation often appear at taxonomic boundaries, for example, greater
relative volume of the forebrain and cerebellum in mammals
compared to reptiles and fish at comparable brain sizes, to
which we will return later (Jerison, 1973; Northcutt, 1981; Yopak
et al., 2010). In addition, developmental features associated with
this conserved evolutionary outcome are being identified: the
conserved segmental divisions common to all vertebrate brains
(Puelles et al., 2013) coupled with a conserved pattern of neurogenesis whose property of “late equals large” automatically produces
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disproportionate growth in the same regions (cerebellum, forebrain) in the largest brains across every vertebrate taxonomic
group (Finlay et al., 1998). This identification of a developmental
mechanism underlying allometric regularity in no way eliminates
the requirement that an adaptive account be given of concerted
scaling as much as for species-specific adaptation. The notion
that a disadvantageous pattern of cell proliferation (appealing to
“developmental constraint” as initially hypothesized by Gould,
1977) would be conserved over 450–500 MYA, particularly given
the metabolic cost of the brain, is implausible in the extreme. A
similar pattern of overwhelming conservation has been described
in multiple domains, principally the vertebrate body plan and
basic physiological circuits (Gerhart and Kirschner, 1997), and
has required the same shift in explanatory style. Given all this
conservation, however, species variations in behavior most definitely exist and must be accounted for, considering any collection
you choose—catfish, catbirds and cats, for example. The need to
explain these profound differences does not disappear if residual
variation in brain structure volumes does a poor job in accounting for them. Fresh approaches to this problem will be the focus
of this paper.
Considering the adaptive value of conserved scaling, and its
niche-independent, brain-size-dependent features, a molar and
a molecular account can both be given. The molar account has
been discussed elsewhere, and concerns the benefits of this pattern of allometric scaling for a computational device (Finlay et al.,
2011; Charvet and Finlay, 2012). Some kinds of computational
architectures are simultaneously more amenable to addition or
loss of components (such as memory resources) than others
(Brooks, 1986; Hawes et al., 2007). Considering the cortex alone,
the rostral-to-caudal gradient in length of cortical neurogenesis
with its resulting rostral to caudal gradient in increasing neuron
number per cortical column, which becomes more pronounced
in increasingly larger brains, can be directly related to progressive
reduction of dimensions and abstraction of information on that
same axis (Charvet et al., 2013).
Here instead we will concentrate on the second problem of
how adaptive specializations may be enacted within a generic
architecture. First we will look in more detail at the claim that
the relative numbers of neurons in or volumes of CNS structures are associated with or are a mechanism of species-specific
adaptations. We will particularly underline the idea that many
of the demonstrations of such effects, particularly in the case of
volumes, may well be describing the downstream effects of the
animal’s extensive use of a particular sensory modality due to
increased elaboration of the sensory periphery, activity changes
or motivational state, resculpting the nervous system via its own
activity. Changes in brain volumes may often be the result, not the
cause of a behavioral change or an alteration in the sensorimotor periphery (Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012). We will also note that
the assumption that increase in neuron number should result in
improvements in function is often unjustified, particularly when
the computational role of each nucleus and neuron class in a
functional system is considered.
The potential, empirically well-described, developmental
sources of changes in neuron numbers and volume are myriad, even considering only neocortex. These minimally include
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reassignment of embryonic boundaries (Alfano and Studer,
2013); rate and duration of neurogenesis (Charvet et al., 2011;
Workman et al., 2013); respecification of neuronal type or redirection of migration (Letinic and Rakic, 2001); developmental cell
death (Finlay and Slattery, 1983; Rehen et al., 2001), and activitydependent increases in axonal and dendritic arbors produced by
experience and resulting changes in cortical volumes (Greenough
and Black, 1992; Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012). This list is long if
we consider only neuroanatomically defined regions (like “striate
cortex”), and even more extensive still if we consider methods,
like reuse (Anderson, 2010), by which active inputs may claim
processing space in the brain in multimodal or otherwise associative regions. Each developmental mechanism has a range of
effect sizes, and developmental onset and offset that should be
relevant to our understanding of brain evolution. To understand
what kinds of evolution are possible we need to distinguish “primary” genetic changes from the downstream effects of the brain
environment of neuroplasticity. Sometimes neuroplasticity might
be expected to constrain the effects of undesirable changes, and
other times amplify useful ones, and we will supply examples of
both.
REGULATION OF NEURON NUMBER IN INDIVIDUAL BRAIN REGIONS

The idea of specialized, localized functional modules as targets
of selection appeared to simplify the problem of selecting for
behavioral adaptations by coupling two features both thought to
be important in enhancements of brain function. First, special
circuitry is often proposed as central to new functionality (from
the control of jointed limbs to “grammar modules”). Second, it
seems reasonable that more processing resources, neurons and
connectivity both, should be committed to important, speciesspecific capabilities. If both changes could be realized in a single
brain part, it would appear to be more efficient than a search
of the evolutionary landscape of the entire brain for an optimal
combination of dedicated neurons and altered circuitry. As such
extreme discrete functional adaptations eventually became to seem
unlikely, as discussed earlier under “massive modularity,” a search
for how single functional adaptations might be made to “cascade”
through spatially separated regions of the developing nervous
system was begun. This search produced unexpected results.
The observation that neurons are massively overproduced in
early development and die as they establish connectivity (as
do synapses) produced a first attempt at neural “evo-devo”
(Oppenheim, 1991). The particular case of sexual differentiation
of neuron number for sexual behavior in vertebrates is a reasonable entry point, as it involves control of different muscle
mass, numbers of motorneurons in the spinal cord and control of the behavior at supraspinal levels. The rat spinal cord
begins as uniform in neuron number, and early testosterone
allows the survival of the motor neurons associated with the
male reproductive apparatus by supporting muscle survival in the
periphery; the neurons die in females without the trophic support supplied by the muscle fibers (Lubischer and Arnold, 1995;
McCarthy and Arnold, 2011). This hypothesized method of generating system-wide individual differences was eagerly seized as
a potential model to sculpt species differences by propagating
a single genetic change through the developing nervous system:
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perhaps a “generic” central nervous system might be generated,
and a single specialization, for example, a larger eye, could cascade through multiple sites in the brain by rescuing neurons and
synapses from developmental cell death (Finlay, 1992). The functional hypothesis in these series of experiments is similar to the
“mosaic” idea of brain evolution: if an animal is specialized for
a particular function, there would be benefit for it to amplify
the number of neurons committed to that function wholesale
throughout its brain.
As initially plausible as this idea might have been, it proved not
to be the case, neither for sexual differentiation of individuals nor
visual system evolution across species (Oppenheim, 1991; Finlay,
1992). As always, the empirical actuality proved ultimately more
interesting than the first guess. Basically, interconnected groups of
neurons do not respond with any degree of sensitivity to “match”
their relative numbers to each other, but respond with measurable
neuron loss only in cases of catastrophic loss of input or target. A
single change in neuron numbers at one point in a circuit simply did not propagate past its immediate neighbor. For example,
while embryonic complete loss of an eye might cause catastrophic
neuron loss in the midbrain and thalamus, and propagate through
to change the boundaries of visual cortex, the converse manipulation of introducing large increases in retinal input to the same
structures, more relevant to evolutionary adaptations, had little
effect, even though there was potentially a great deal of neuron
loss and synaptic connectivity the extra tissue might “take up”
(Finlay and Pallas, 1989).
The series of experiments of Sarah Pallas and colleagues (Pallas
and Finlay, 1989; Huang and Pallas, 2001) on the physiological consequences to visual system organization of numerical
imbalances in interconnecting structure provided a case where
mechanisms of plasticity appear to work to counter the effects
of localized increases in neuron number. These experiments redirected our interest from the idea that increased neuron number
in a single structure might be a useful building block of brain
evolution to instead, how sensorimotor systems insure the reliability of how they extract information, which we discuss at a
little length to illustrate the point. Initially we imagined supplying supranormal retinal input to the midbrain might illuminate
how the receptive fields of neurons in the superior colliculus
were constructed: we imagined that the receptive field of each cell
would have to be twice as large to accommodate the increased
input. Nothing of the kind happened: the receptive field sizes of
single neurons remained the same. Eventually it appeared that
the mapping problem was solved not by reducing cell death in
the supra-innervated colliculus, nor allowing increased convergence on single cells, but by increasing the spatial overlap or
redundancy of midbrain cells’ receptive fields. Activity-dependent
mechanisms operating at the midbrain target “permitted” receptive fields only of a certain size, prohibiting plasticity in spatial
convergence on single neurons. In hindsight, considering how a
functioning visual system should best respond to unexpectedly
large ratio variations in neuron number between brain structures,
it now seems reasonable that an animal’s visual acuity should
never be dependent on the ratio relationship of its internal parts,
but that hard-won peripheral acuity should be maintained over
variations as much as possible. In this case, a plastic mechanism
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works to defend visual function and conserve receptive field properties, and preserve the animal’s midbrain-dependent behaviors
(Xiong and Finlay, 1996).
When specializations of sensorimotor or behavioral systems
in particular species are obvious, what is genetically changed in
those species? First, and predominantly, extreme differences can
routinely be seen in the sensory and motor periphery. Across sensory systems, the details of peripheral topography will be found
faithfully reproduced in the cortex (e.g., Silveira et al., 1989;
Catania and Kaas, 1995; Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012; Meyer et al.,
2013). An evo-devo account of the minimal number of alterations
of neurogenesis to produce the very long list of changes of the eye
of the nocturnal owl monkey compared to its diurnal forebears,
concentrating on the enrichment of its population of rods and 4
other retinal neuron classes, has been made by one of the authors
and her colleagues (Dyer et al., 2009) the point of this example is
both to emphasize the multiple specializations for light capture of
the nocturnal eye, and the mechanisms coordinating them. Close
to the periphery, but definitely within the CNS, special computational devices can be seen, for example, the delay-line neurons
of the superior olive that compute time-of-arrival differences for
auditory input in the two ears (Carr and Konishi, 1988). Deeper
in the CNS, adaptations for special processing that are specified independent of input become progressively more difficult
to identify—for example, if there are genetically-specified special transmitters, receptors, or axon lengths in the striate cortex
of particular advantage for vision, they have never been explicitly
identified. The idea of a “canonical circuit” in the cortex spanning
multiple modalities has come to dominate current discussion
(Douglas and Martin, 2004; Harris and Mrsic-Flogel, 2013).
While a number of individual reports of selective structural
increases of presumed adaptive significance have been made (to
be reviewed below), it is worth recalling first that several extensive surveys of particular sensory and behavioral systems with the
intention to describe number or volume differences have produced negative results (with the striking exception of the song
system in passerine birds). This negative catalogue is rarely cited.
For example, Glendenning and Masterton (1998) undertook an
analysis of the volumes of 10 subcortical auditory nuclei in 53
diverse mammals, and found they were all highly correlated, and
predicted from overall brain size. The three species that deviated
most in increased size from the mean values were the little brown
bat (other microbats were not unusual), the beaver and the laboratory mouse, the latter two not usually remarked for auditory
specialization. Similarly, relative “dexterity,” using a scale ranking
animals from hooves to hands, was predicted better from absolute
brain size than the relative size of somatosensory cortex (Nudo
and Masterton, 1990). Across both birds and mammals, the idea
that the relative demands on memory for scatter-hoarding vs.
other methods of foraging should be associated with a larger hippocampus enjoyed an initial success (Sherry et al., 1989; Jacobs
and Spencer, 1994; Healy and Krebs, 1996), which became progressively less clear as the details of the relationship of real-world
foraging to memory, and the lability of hippocampal volume
became better understood (Roth et al., 2010; Smulders et al.,
2010). A series of studies of the neuron numbers and volumes
of visual system structures in primates and mammals including
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the retina and fovea (Franco et al., 2001; Finlay et al., 2008),
lateral geniculate (Finlay et al., 2013), pulvinar (Chalfin et al.,
2007), superior colliculus (Cheung, 2003), striate and extrastriate
cortex (Kaskan et al., 2005), showed no niche-related effects unexplained by scaling but one (to be discussed) in central structures,
major differences of multiple features of the eye and retina, and
a substantial “grade shift” between midbrain and forebrain scaling in rodents vs. primates independent of niche. The bird “song
system,” however, stands out as a counterexample. Though the
identification of the volume of a nucleus specifically with numbers of songs has undergone much elaboration and qualification
since its original description (Nottebohm et al., 1981), numerous forebrain specializations have been demonstrated including
relationships of neuron numbers to elaborations of capacity,
relationship of the same to variation between species (Szekely
et al., 1996), and heritability of such differences (Airey et al.,
2000). What feature of the song system distinguishes it from
the other systems we have reviewed is clearly of major interest.
Overall, the point of this catalogue is not to engage the argument
that genetically-specified increases in neuron numbers in CNS
structures associated with species-specific adaptions have not or
cannot ever occur, but that they are simply not as pervasive as
an evolutionary mechanism as the list of isolated examples often
offered would suggest. In fact, they appear to be rare.
It is worth recalling that while the allometric predictability of
neural volumes is very high, the residual variation of individual
structures (between and within species) is also high, due to the
enormous range of brain sizes.
. . . The enormous range of structure sizes across species is
important for the following reason: In a moderate-sized sample,
a normally distributed variable typically has a total sample range
of about five times its standard deviation. In predicting the size
of brain structures, as noted above, the standard deviation of predictive errors is 0.187 averaged across structures when variables
are measured on logarithmic scales. This suggests that for a typical
structure, two species identical on our two major factors may have
structure sizes differing by as much as 5 X 0.187 or 0.935 on a logarithmic scale. Because exp(O.935) = 2.55, individual structures
may differ by a factor of as much as 2.5 in size, even when the two
species being compared are very similar on the two major factors.
Inspection of the raw data confirms this conclusion. To the investigator seeking evidence for species-specific adaptation, a twofold
difference in a structure’s volume is striking, even if it is trivial in
comparison to the total range of size of that structure and small
in comparison to the range of structure size with body size held
constant. (Finlay and Darlington, 1995), p. 1580.

So, for example, if a single comparison of the superior colliculus of the nocturnal laboratory rat is made to the diurnal
ground squirrel, the two differ in volume by a factor of 10
though their overall brain size is fairly similar (Kaas and Collins,
2001). Unfortunately, however, it is also the case that in the
rodent lineage across multiple species there is simply no significant relationship between nocturnal/diurnal niche and midbrain
size demonstrable thus far, as laid out in the previous list of citations. Large variations between individuals within a species are
often observed, as well. One of the first was the observation of
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Van Essen and colleagues of nearly four-fold variation in surface
area in a small sample of macaque primary visual cortex area
(1984). Recently, variation in attention to local vs. global orientation sensitivity has been linked to V1 size (Song et al., 2013) and
increased Vernier acuity and decreased susceptibility to two optical illusions (Bakken et al., 2012). An adaptive purpose for these
distinctions is not obvious, and no clinically important “small V1
syndrome” has ever emerged. Large ranges in number and volume
between individuals within species in at every level of the visual
system can be seen, variability characterized by a strong central
trend with distinct outliers, but with no identification of the outliers with any obvious behavioral pathology (Franco et al., 2001;
Kaskan et al., 2005). It will be interesting to attempt to make specific predictions in any of these cases, but the “rectifying” nature
of the neuroplasticity environment discussed earlier for numerical imbalances should be taken into account (Pallas and Finlay,
1989) The case of dramatic “imbalances” in the red/green photoreceptor opsin array unaccompanied by perceptual differences
will be discussed shortly (Williams et al., 1993).
Many reported volume increases in single structures linked
to niche-specific variations are likely to be the outcome of a
“generic” nervous system operating in an unusual niche: the
effects of environmental deprivation and enrichment on primary visual cortex volumes, for example, range around 5–10%
(Greenough and Black, 1992), and feral rats differ from laboratory rats in these approximate magnitudes (Krubitzer et al.,
2011). Not all observations can be described this way: two species
of squirrels appeared to have larger relative areas of visual compared to somatosensory cortex, which will be useful for further
investigation of phylogenetic vs. developmental causes of this
kind of specialization (Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012). Other examples of “coordinated” changes within functional systems seem
likely to be developmental, if not tautological in origin: synaptically connected structures within functional systems literally
contain volumetric components of each other in their axonal
inputs (Barton and Harvey, 2000; Barton et al., 2003).
In the study of primate vision, contesting and conflicting
accounts of the adaptive purpose of visual system features are
ceaselessly argued. For example, considering the trichromacy of
New and Old World primates [whose species comprise a majority
of frugivores, but also insectivores, folivores, carnivores, treegum-specialists and omnivores like ourselves (Fleagle, 1999)],
convincing evidence that trichromacy improves scene segmentation (Hansen and Gegenfurtner, 2009), distinction of shading
from reflectance (Kingdom, 2003), social communication involving detection of blood oxygenation, (Changizi et al., 2006), foraging for fruits (Regan et al., 2001), or distinction of leaf age
for folivory (Lucas et al., 1997) have all been offered; clearly it
is likely that trichromacy contributes to all of them. But when
we leave psychophysics and turn to the brain, details of what
adaptation and what processing model best describe the primate
visual system are left behind, using the assumption of “more is
better” for every stage of visual system organization. For example, Barton argues that a statistically demonstrable increase in the
P/M cell ratio of the lateral geniculate is a special adaptation for
frugivory in diurnal primates. The ratio of parvocellular neurons
(P cells, small cells, primarily representing the fovea, specialized
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for high spatial acuity and one aspect of trichromacy) vs. magnocellular neurons (M cells; larger neurons, more evenly spread
across the retina; higher temporal acuity and participating in
dichromacy only) in the lateral geniculate increases with regular
allometry with brain size and is slightly higher in diurnal primates than nocturnal ones (Barton, 1998, 2004). We were recently
able to confirm and extend this observation (P/M ratio higher in
diurnal primates) to more primate species (Finlay et al., 2013),
but also show that the cause was likely to be the developmental cell death of the M neurons representing the visual periphery,
competing unsuccessfully for synaptic space in primary visual
cortex dominated by early arrival and topographic occupation of
the cortex by the foveal representation, a hitherto unexplained
developmental observation of Williams and Rakic (1988). The
cause of the changed ratio, therefore, is not a genetic change
directly producing greater P cell numbers, but a downstream
effect of the developmentally “generic” mechanism of active and
early-generated sensory specializations claiming greater synaptic
space.
The differing computational role of number at different stages
of sensory and cognitive analysis needs to be considered as well
when considering allometric relationships—how much more is
better? For example, in the primate retina, cones, because they
are flooded with photons in high light levels, may sample a large
visual angle selectively without loss in acuity without increase
in number as the eye enlarges, while rods normally carpet the
retina to maximize sensitivity. The allometric outcome is that
rods increase rapidly in number with eye size while cone numbers change little, so that humans, the primate with the largest
eye, have by far the most rods of the diurnal primates (Finlay
et al., 2008). The optic nerve and primary visual thalamic nuclei,
in concert with sensory thalamic nuclei in general, appear to
be defended as a bottleneck, and do not increase rapidly with
brain size. This phenomenon has several interesting candidate
functions, such as production of an efficient compression or
multiplexing of retinal input, or roughly equilibrating the information contributed by various sensory modalities to the cortex
(Fetsch et al., 2013).
Overall, we argue, with the several empirical exceptions noted,
that the evidence for structure-by-structure genetic selection on
neuron number for particular adaptive ends is surprisingly poor,
especially given the pervasive belief the phenomenon should exist.
Most of the variance in neuron number is shared, and the simple existence of unshared variance by itself is not evidence for
“mosaic” evolution. Marked individual local variations in number so far have not advertised their functional consequences, and
in at least a few cases, appeared to be actively compensated rather
than exploited. Within the visual system, and perhaps for sensory systems generally, a niche-independent computational role
for the scaling of each cell group can often be identified. Several
striking time points in vertebrate evolution exist where changes
relative proliferation of brain parts accompanies a niche change,
such as those associated with homeothermy, or becoming terrestrial. Interestingly, though, in those cases, the structures with the
highest allometric slopes in the stem group are the same ones
that are further amplified in the derived group. There is, however, at least one distributed, covarying and relatively independent
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system that can be discriminated within the brain, from the onset
of vertebrate evolution. This is the “limbic” system, comprising
olfactory bulb and cortices, hippocampus and various forebrain
nuclei, which varies relatively independently from the rest of the
brain (Jerison, 1973; Finlay and Darlington, 1995; Reep et al.,
2007). Why this relative independence should have persisted for
450 MY, in tandem with the regular scaling of the rest of the
brain, is a very intriguing question. Several distinctions can be
made between these functions of these large systems, the first
olfactory vs. visual specialization, but that does not exhaust all
possibilities. Egocentric vs. allocentric spatial representations, and
short-term vs. very long term memory storage distinguish these
systems as well.
EXAMPLES OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY IN NERVOUS SYSTEMS, FROM
NEURONS TO REGIONS

In light of such increasingly common discoveries as those
detailed above, a different perspective on functional brain evolution and organization has begun to emerge, that puts the
focus not on the selective targeting of individual structures, but
instead on overall efficiency in deployment of neural resources.
According to these so-called neural reuse theories (Anderson,
2010), resource constraints and efficiency considerations dictate
that, rather than developing new structures de novo, whenever possible neural, behavioral and environmental resources
should have been reused and redeployed in support of any newly
emerging cognitive capacities. That is, rather than following an
evolutionary/developmental pathway wherein organisms develop
specialized, dedicated neural hardware to meet each new adaptive challenge, reuse suggests that much local neural structure is
conserved but is often combined and recombined by different
organisms in different ways to achieve diverse purposes. The fact
of functional differentiation between parts of the brain need not
imply the existence of functional specialization in all such cases.
We have, of course, already seen many examples, and such
reuse of neural elements to regulate multiple behaviors seems to
be the rule rather than the exception in the nervous systems of
many animals. Examples of neural reuse can be found across the
animal kingdom, suggesting it is a vitally important evolutionary strategy for deploying scarce neural resources to the greatest
behavioral and adaptive effect.
Reuse may also be found in neurons involved in learning
and memory. In the pond snail (Lymnea stagnalis), the breathing
rhythm is generated by three synaptically connected neurons that
form a central pattern generator. One of these neurons, RPeD1,
is also necessary for many aspects of learning and memory; and
removing the RPeD1 cell body can prevent the formation or
reconsolidation of long-term memories (Sangha et al., 2003). In
honeybees (Apis mellifera), a single identified neuron (VUMmx1)
in the suboesophageal ganglion mediates the reward pathway
in associative olfactory learning, but this neuron has also been
implicated in learning phenomena as diverse as second-order conditioning and blocking (Menzel, 2009). (Niven and Chittka, 2010;
p. 285)

Similar neuromodulation comes in many guises in vertebrates.
A textbook example of neural re-use employing gain and gating
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changes is the “duplex” retina: beginning from the receptors, the
neurons of the retina can be engaged, de-coupled, or have their
processing features entirely reorganized depending on whether
they are participating in scotopic, (low light or nocturnal) vision,
or photopic, (high light level or diurnal) vision (Palmer, 1998).
Vertebrate vision appears to have originally arisen for conditions
of high light levels, and adaptations for higher sensitivity in dim
light appeared secondarily, employing the same retinal neurons
(for a general review, Bowmaker, 2012). Transitions in visual
niche have occurred repeatedly, within large taxonomic groups,
such as those including sharks and rays (Yopak et al., 2010), at
the emergence of the first mammals occupying nocturnal niches,
and notably in primates, where diurnal primates emerged from
primarily nocturnal stem species (Ross, 2000; Gerkema et al.,
2013). At the cellular level, the catalogue of adjustments is long,
but one example is illustrative: for low-light vision, the lateral
inhibition opposing the responses of the center and periphery of
visual receptive field normally seen in diurnal vision is removed,
increasing sensitivity and reducing spatial acuity. This alteration
can be produced directly, by a change in ambient light level, or
predictively, in accord with circadian rhythmicity (Palmer, 1998).
Although the nearest-neighbor relationship of retinal cells is preserved in low-light vision, the central specialization of the fovea is
essentially removed as well. The basis of receptive field structure
in diurnal vision, lateral inhibition, is removed from retina, lateral geniculate and visual cortex in nocturnal vision, yet the same
structures are used to see.
The transition from night to day vision in individuals in
species that can function in both milieus, notably ourselves, is
easy. Interestingly, the wholesale evolutionary transition from a
retina adapted to diurnal vision to nocturnal vision (in New
World monkeys, Dyer et al., 2009) is similarly easy, harnessing
the temporal relationships of neurogenesis seen in the diurnal
peripheral retina to change the complement of all types of retinal
neurons in one step. The availability of re-use in central nervous
system targets of the retina allows this complex transition to be
produced by changing timing relations in a few control steps in
the retina alone, rather than by respecifying the physiology of each
and every participating neuron directly, or worse yet, having to
generate a second nocturnal eye.
Finally, there is a good deal of emerging work that points to
the importance of the large-scale modulation of neural partnerships in support of cognitive function. For instance, changes in
the oscillatory coherence between brain regions (local and longdistance) appear to be important to sensory binding, the modulation of attention, and other cognitive functions (Steinmetz et al.,
2000; Uhlhaas et al., 2009; Varela et al., 2001; Fries, 2009; Nacher
et al., 2013). The basic finding that cognitive function involves
the reuse of the same elements in different configurations is illustrated by two early studies: Friston (1997) demonstrated that
whether a given region of inferotemporal cortex was face selective
depended on the level of activity in posterior parietal cortex; and
McIntosh et al. (1994) report on a region of inferotemporal cortex
and a region of prefrontal cortex that both support face identification and spatial attention. In the latter study, McIntosh and
colleagues showed that during the face processing task the inferotemporal region cooperated strongly with a region of superior
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parietal cortex; while during the attention task, that same region
of parietal cortex cooperated more strongly with the prefrontal
area. Similar patterns of changing functional connectivity are
observed over developmental time, which suggests that acquiring new skills involves changes to both local and long-distance
functional partnerships (Fair et al., 2007, 2009; Supekar et al.,
2009).
Our examples, due to the specializations of the authors, are
principally drawn from vision and human cognition, but it is
worth noting that it presents little challenge to find comparable
examples in motivational and emotional domains. In voles, the
transition from principally promiscuous to principally monogamous mating systems, both between species, between individuals, and perhaps over development, is thought to involve the
interposition of a vasotocin or oxytocin receptor gate involving
individual recognition in basic reinforcement circuitry (Insel and
Young, 2001). Adjustment of sensory gain can be seen in the
stress-induced analgesia observed in both rodents and humans
(Akil et al., 1984; Bargmann, 2012). Stress can also change the
configuration of large scale brain networks across a number of
species including humans (Hermans et al., 2011), including earlystage sensory processing depending on emotional arousal, as
demonstrated in V1 by Mourao-Miranda et al. (2003).
Some intriguing further evidence for the reuse of larger neural elements comes from data-mining large collections of human
neuroimaging studies. For example, Poldrack (2006) estimated
the selectivity of Broca’s area by performing a Bayesian analysis of
3222 imaging studies from the BrainMap database (Laird et al.,
2005). He concludes that current evidence for the notion that
Broca’s area is a “language” region is fairly weak, in part because
it was more frequently activated by non-language tasks than by
language-related ones. Similarly, several whole-brain statistical
analyses of large collections experiments from BrainMap (Laird
et al., 2005), Neurosynth (Yarkoni et al., 2011) and other sources
demonstrate that most regions of the brain—even fairly small
regions—appear to be activated by multiple tasks across diverse
task categories (Anderson, 2010; Anderson and Penner-Wilger,
2013; Anderson et al., 2013).
The observable large-scale patterns of use and reuse of individual regions of the brain across multiple circumstances suggests
that this functional diversity is a reflection of the evolutionary
and developmental history of the human brain. For instance, it
appears that, ceteris paribus, the “older” regions of the human
cortex, the primary sensory areas possessed by every mammal
(Krubitzer, 2009) as distinguished from the various association
regions which appear selectively in larger brains, tend to be used
in more tasks—presumably because they’ve been around for
longer, and have thus had more opportunity to be incorporated
into multiple functional coalitions (Anderson, 2007). In addition,
more recently emerging cognitive functions, such as language,
appear to be supported by more and more widely scattered brain
regions than are evolutionarily older functions such as vision and
attention (Anderson, 2010; Anderson and Penner-Wilger, 2013).
Again, this makes sense in light of both progressive functional
differentiation and evolutionary continuity, for the later a given
cognitive process or behavioral competence emerges, the greater
the number and diversity of neural structures that will be available
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to support the new competence, and there is little reason to
believe the useful structures will be near one another in the brain.
Thus, while massive modularity and neural reuse both agree
that functional brain architecture needs to be understood in
an evolutionary framework, these positions differ on the question of where and how evolutionary pressures are likely to be
felt. In particular, it is important to notice the following crucial
implication of widespread neural reuse for massive modularity:
insofar as these different cognitive and behavioral capacities are
supported by reusing many of the same neural elements in different functional coalitions, it is hard to see how it would be
possible to separately target and modify these coalitions via natural selection [or by any other means; for further discussion see
(Anderson, 2010, 2014)]. Functional “modules” that are built
out of shared parts will rarely be separately modifiable; these
findings thus encourage a shift in thinking away from massive
modularity and individually tailored and inherited solutions to
adaptive problems, and toward models that favor more concerted
evolution.
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN A GENERIC NERVOUS
SYSTEM: THREE EVO-DEVO SOLUTIONS

All of the foregoing does raise a crucial question: how can one
get specialized, differential, heritable function in nervous systems
where concerted evolution appears necessary for both functional
and architectural reasons? The key is seeing how evolutionary and
developmental mechanisms can work together. We will describe
three evo-devo interactions for which evidence exists. The first
is a canonical example of “evolvability” in which existing information processing mechanisms accept and immediately employ a
new dimension of sensory information when it is made available
by a genetic change in the sensory periphery. The second example
explores the interaction between motivational “presets” and the
population of the central nervous system with the information
the organism then preferentially acquires. Finally, we will discuss
mechanisms of active search for available neural resources.
For the first example, cooperation between evolutionary and
developmental mechanisms can be seen in the case of color vision
plasticity (Neitz et al., 2002). A remarkable fact about color vision
is that there is very little inter-individual variation in performance, despite immense differences in the (largely) genetically
specified ratio of L to M cones in the retina. There is, for instance,
almost zero variation in the wavelength of light judged to be
“uniquely yellow” (without red or green tint), despite a 25 fold
variation in LM cone ratio (Williams et al., 1993).
In a series of experiments, (Neitz et al., 2002) systematically
altered the color environments of several adult subjects through
the use of colored contacts, special lighting schemes and similar measures. They showed that there exists a cortical mechanism
for adjusting the sensory gain, such that the signal received from
the L and M cones remains in equilibrium under prevailing environmental conditions—that is, given the mean chromaticity of
the experienced environment. They hypothesize that this developmental mechanism allows for standardized color vision despite
genetic and environmental variation. The selective advantage of
such standardized color vision would tend to stabilize the evolutionary and developmental mechanisms that produce it. They
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hypothesize that this is the identical mechanism that permits the
trichromacy that normally arises by the mutation of one opsin in
about two thirds of female New World monkeys in the absence
of any known brain changes (Jacobs, 2012), and the rapid emergence of behavioral trichromacy after “knock-in” of a third opsin
into normally dichromatic monkeys (Mancuso et al., 2009).
For our second evo-devo example, the motivational “presets”
which certainly vary between species and may vary between individuals, will certainly alter which environments individuals select,
what sensory stimulation they seek, and thus how their brain, and
particularly the cortex, becomes populated with information. For
example, some species of birds are solitary, and are made anxious or aggressive by the presence of conspecifics, while others
have the opposite response, related to non-apeptide distribution
in the basal forebrain (Goodson et al., 2012). The progeny of these
birds, whether or not the individual offspring itself has the corresponding motivational bias, will grow up in an environment
absent of most other birds in the first case, and full of birds in
the second. The most well-known example in the human literature of such a “preset” is the preference of infants to look at the
human face. Human infants prefer to look at face-like configurations (Johnson, 2011), and will work hard and learn quickly for
social reinforcement (Goldstein and Schwade, 2008). Even with
the initial preference for faces, being likely subcortical (Johnson,
2001), the advantages of the eye coloration and our contrasting
sclera enabling gaze-tracking, and enthusiasm for social learning, it still takes 7–10 years for the representation of faces in the
cortex of human children to begin to approximate adult organization (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2011). In autism, abnormal social
interaction, abnormalities in both early and late patterns of eye
movements, and alteration of face-processing regions in the cortex all co-occur (Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012). The predisposing
condition to produce a cortex with a substantial percentage of
its volume involved in processing faces and the nuances of emotional expression might only need motivated coupling of early eye
and head movements toward expressive faces over long developmental time. The question of how this information is allocated
to regions is a question that can be studied phylogenetically,
developmentally, and in the service of individual differences.
Finally we consider active search for coordinated input. In
addition to instances of sensory gain modulation involving the
tuning of local neural responses, there is some suggestive evidence
for a neural “search” mechanism that works to establish functional partnerships between cells and between cortical regions.
For instance, learning to control an artificial limb via a direct
cortical interface (a so-called brain-machine interface, or BMI)
appears to involve both an alteration of the tuning curves for individual cells, and also a change in the patterns of functional correlation between cells in the local network. Lebedev and Nicoleilis
(2006) describe the neural effects of the learning process this way:
[C]ontinuous BMI operations in primates lead to physiological changes in neuronal tuning, which include changes in preferred
direction and direction tuning strength of neurons (Taylor et al.,
2002; Carmena et al., 2003; Lebedev et al., 2005). In addition,
broad changes in pair-wise neuronal correlation can be detected
after BMIs are switched to operate fully under brain-control mode
(Carmena et al., 2003; Lebedev et al., 2005).

www.frontiersin.org

January 2014 | Volume 7 | Article 918 | 11

Anderson and Finlay

Allocating structure to function

Along with these physiological adaptations of neuronal firing
patterns, behavioral performance improves as animals learn to
operate BMIs effectively (Taylor et al., 2002; Carmena et al., 2003;
Lebedev et al., 2005). Initial training to operate a BMI is characterized by an increase in neuronal firing rate variance, which
cannot be simply explained by changes in limb or actuator movements (Zacksenhouse et al., 2005). As the quality of BMI control
improves, initial elevation of neuronal firing variability subsides.
(Lebedev and Nicoleilis, 2006: 542)

In so far as oscillatory coherence between cells is a sign of functional cooperation, then it is intriguing to note that one effect of
the observed increase in neuronal firing rate variance is to implement a walk through cellular coherence space. That is, as the firing
rates of the cells change, they will come into synchrony with a
series of different partners over time. The suggestion is that the
partnerships that produce the desired effects will be strengthened,
with the end result being the establishment of a set of neural partnerships (via “broad changes in pair-wise neuronal correlation”)
able to control the limb.
Similar search mechanisms may be behind cases of sensory
substitution, in which input from one sensory modality (e.g.,
touch) is used to provide information normally provided by
another (e.g., vision), as with the use of a prosthetic camera that
transmits information via mechanical or electrical stimulation to
the skin (Bach-y-Rita et al., 1969), an effect generated more prosaically when using Braille dots for reading. As is by now quite well
known, in such cases parts of the brain that would normally support processing of information in the original sensory modality
can come to support the processing of input in the new modality (Pascual-Leone and Hamilton, 2001; Merabet et al., 2004).
Thus can occipital cortex, normally associated with visual processing come to support tactile processing in these and other cases
(Zangaladze et al., 1999; Amedi et al., 2002; Merabet et al., 2004;
Pietrini et al., 2004). In one particularly interesting case, Merabet
et al. (2008) taught sighted individuals to read Braille while blindfolded, and verified using both fMRI and rTMS that occipital
cortex was part of the supporting network for the skill. However,
after removing the blindfolds, participants remained able to read
Braille but no longer showed activation in occipital cortex. The
skill was now “presumably supported by activity at brain regions
other than the occipital cortex.” (Merabet et al., 2008; p. 8)
Together, these and other pieces of evidence suggest that the
mechanisms underlying neurofunctional development (early as
well as late skill acquisition) include a process of active search:
the rapid testing of multiple neural partnerships to identify functionally adequate options, in some cases multiple alternative
possibilities, leading to a degenerate functional network that can
be modulated depending on circumstances and task demands
(Sporns, 2011; Bargmann, 2012; see Anderson, 2014 for extensive
discussion).
Although the foregoing can hardly be said to establish this
fact, if granted the assumption that the brain possesses mechanisms for functional development that include both the ability
to tune local neural structure in response to task-relevant statistical properties in inputs, and the ability to perform a “search”
for functional partnerships between structural elements at various spatial scales, then it becomes possible to see how systematic,
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heritable, and relatively consistent functional differentiation in
the brain could occur in the absence of targeted modular or
mosaic selection. Given a set of early developing and stereotyped neural projections from sensory afferents, and assuming
an environment that is largely conserved over generations, local
tuning mechanisms would be sufficient to produce local networks with specific and predictable functional structures and
response tendencies. A set of such neural structures with different functional biases (different input-output mappings) would
be enough to allow an ongoing process of neural search to
identify and consolidate the sets of partnerships that reliably supported skills being acquired during development. Consistency in
the early development of functional biases and in the nature of
the tasks being learned by the organism would be sufficient on
this model to produce relatively consistent large-scale functional
networks, without the need for direct evolutionary targeting.
Indeed, in a functionally differentiated but non-modular brain,
selection pressures might work not to produce particular specializations, but rather to stabilize the availability of a diverse
mixture of computational properties in the entire brain (Atallah
et al., 2004) coupled with a range of cortical biases that, given
sensory inputs and the interactions between regions (Johnson,
2001, 2011) reliably produces the functional architecture we
observe.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
So, then, how do we resolve the apparent paradox that existing developmental processes must have been selected both to be
robust to perturbations and accidents, but not so robust as to
be unevolvable? The key lies in seeing how the nature of evolutionary adaptations of the brain and developmental mechanisms
are intertwined and mutually supporting. For instance, insofar as
the properties of environments are generally conserved between
generations, then developmental mechanisms that are sensitive to
those properties will reliably produce “heritable” specializations,
while still being able to compensate when environments change.
Here it is worth emphasizing as well the various ways in which the
behavior of organisms themselves serves to change and stabilize
the environment through various kinds and degrees of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Richerson and Boyd, 2005).
When this is combined with the insight that the brain has a
meta-modal, domain general organization (Pascual-Leone and
Hamilton, 2001; Anderson, 2010), it becomes possible to see how
brain architecture can be robust to perturbations and reliably produce a diverse range of different specialized processing operators
whose cooperation can support species-typical behaviors. When
either opportunity or disaster strikes, the absence of geneticallyspecified, domain-specific, stereotyped, modular structures and
the multiple mechanisms of neuroplasticity permit evolvability.
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